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The purpose of this article is to consider anew the tests which deter-
mine whether a covenant in a lease will run with the land. The subject
is by no means novel. The leading case was decided in 1583,1 if the
resolutions promulgated in Spencer's Case can be considered a decision.
But in view of the seeming conflict between the first and second reso-
'Spencer's Case (1583, K. B.) 51Co. Rep. 16a. The first two resolutions read
as follows:
i. When the covenant extends to a thing in esse, parcel of the demise, the thing
to be done by force of the covenant is quodammodo annexed and appurtenant
to the thing demised, and shall go with the land, and shall bind the assignee
although he be not bound by express words: but when the covenant extends
to a thing which is not in being at the time of the demise made, it cannot be
appurtenant or annexed to the thing which hath no being: as if the lessee
covenants to repair the houses demised to him during the term, that is parcel
of the contract, and extends to the support of the thing demised, and therefore
is quodammodo annexed appurtenant to houses, and shall bind the assignee
although he be not bound expressly by the covenant: but in the case at bar, the
covenant concerns a thing which was not in esse at the time of the demise made,
but to be newly built after, and therefore shall bind the covenantor, his executors
or administrators, and not the assignee, for the law will not annex the covenant
to a thing which hath no being.
2. It was resolved that in this case, if the lessee had covenanted for him and
his assigns, that they would make a new wall upon some part of the thing
demised, that for as much as it is to be done -upon the land demised, that it
should bind the assignee; for although the covenant doth extend to a thing to
be newly made, yet it is to be made upon the thing demised, and the assignee
is to take the benefit of it, and therefore shall bind the assignee by express
words. So on the other side, if a warranty be made to one, his heirs and
assigns, by express words, the assignee shall take benefit of it, and shall have
a Warrantia Chartae, F. N. B. I35, & g E. 2. Garr' de Charters 30,36 E. 3. Garr.
I, 4 H. 8. Dyer i. But although the covenant be for him and his assigns, yet if
the thing to be done be merely collateral to the land, and doth not touch or
concern the thing demised in any sort, there the assignee shall not b-charged.
As if the lessee covenants for him and his assigns to build a house upon the
land of the lessor which is no parcel of the demise, or to pay any collateral
sum to the lessor, or to a stranger, it shall not bind the assignee, because it is
merely collateral, and in no manner touches or concerns the thing that was
demised, or that is assigned over; and therefore in such case the assignee of
the thing demised cannot be charged with it, no more than any other stranger,
[127]
YALE LAW JOURNAL
lutions of that case, the doubt as to what the actual decision was,
2 and
the conflict which has arisen among cases which purport to follow it,
it may not be wholly without worth to see whether later decisions do not
enable us to reformulate the tests somewhat more clearly.
The first question is as to just what we mean by a covenant which
runs with the land. It is a covenant which is so attached to the land,
that the right to enforce it, or the obligation to perform it, passes with
the estate conveyed, as an incident of ownership.
There is special necessity for permitting the creation of such cove-
nants in leases. Many of the incidents of a leasehold estate and reversion
are executory covenants. At common law one who is not a party to
a covenant can neither sue 3 nor be sued
4 directly upon it. The parties
to the covenants in a lease are the original lessor and the original lessee.
If either convey his estate, his grantee can neither sue nor be sued as
a party to the covenant in the lease, unless such covenants pass as an
incident of the estate conveyed. But a large part of the value of the
lease would disappear unless the direct relation of landlord and tenant
be preserved, as between the assigns of the original parties to the lease,
by giving to each a remedy upon, and imposing on each an obligation
under, the covenants of the lease. To meet this necessity the Statute of
32 Hen. VIII, c. 34, was passed in 154o. This statute has been held
to be part of the common law in the great majority of our states.5
The point that privity of estate is the key to the situation is empha-
sized by the circumstances under which St. 32 Hen. VIII, c. 34, was
enacted. After Henry VIII broke with the Pope he caused the lands
of" many monasteries to be forefeited to the Crown and subsequently
granted them to others. Many of these lands were under lease. By rea-
son of the forfeiture it was impossible to work out even the semblance of
an assignment by the lessors of the covenants contained in the leases.
2 See Purvis v. Shunwn (1916) 273 Ili. 286, 294, 112 N. E. 679, 682; Sexauer v.
Wilson (1907) 136 Iowa, 357, 362, 113 Nt W. 941, 943; Masury v. Southworth
(1859) 9 Ohio St. 340, 350; Bald Eagle Ry. v. Nittany etc. Ry. (895) 171 Pa.
284, :294-5, 33 Atl. 239, 241.
Sanders v. Filley (1832, Mass.) 12 Pick. 554; Johnson v. Foster (1846, Mass.)
12 Met. 167; Millard v. Baldwin (1855, Mass.) 3 Gray, 484; Flynn v. North
American L. Ins. Co. (1874) 115 Mass. 449; Thomas v. Hayward (1869) L. R.
4 Exch. 311; Tallman v. Coffin (185o) 4 N. Y. 134; Hansen v. Meyer (1876) 81
Ill. 321.
'Boyden v. Hill (19o8) 198 Mass. 477, 85 N. E. 413; New England etc. Co. v.
Rockport Granite Co. (1889) 149 Mass. 381, 21 N. E. 947.
'Sims, Real Covenants (9O) 73 et seq.; Scott v. Lunt (1833, U. S.) 7 Pet.
596, 6o6; Sheets v. Selden (1864, U. S.) 2 Wall. 177, 189; Howland v. 
Coffin
(1831, Mass.) 12 Pick. 125, 126; Patten v. Deshon (1854, Mass.) 1 Gray, 325,
326; Carleton v. Bird (9oo) 94 Me. 182, 191, 47 Atl. 154, 156 (semble). In
some states it has been in substance re-enacted. See Sims, loc. cit. See note
9 infra.
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Consequently, the grantees of the Crown received lands subject to
leases the covenants of which they could not enforce against the lessees
because they (the grantees) were not parties thereto.6 Some remedy
was necessary. That remedy was -St. (1540) 32 Hen. VIII, c. 34, which
provided, in substance, that the grantees of the King and the heirs,
executors, successors and assigns of the lessors, should have the same
remedies against the lessees, their executors, administrators and assigns,
as the lessors would have had, and conversely that the lessees, their
executors, administrators and assigns, should have the-same remedies
against the grantees of the King and the lessors, their heirs, successors
and assigns, as the lessees would have had. Thus St. 32 Hen. VIII, c.
34, created, as between lessors and lessees, and their respective heirs,
executors, administrators, successors and assigns, an exception to the
rule that one who is not a party to a covenant can neither sue nor be
sued upon it. Yet it did not create privity of contract between either
the lessor or the lessee and an assign of either. The mutuality of
remedy conferred by the statute rests upon privity of estate7 and con-
tinues only so long as such privity exists.8 Thus the need for the relief
given by the statute arose out of privity of estate, where privity of con-
tract was lacking, and consequently is confined to the case where
privity of estate exists.
It is not without significance that a somewhat similar remedy has
been worked out, without the aid of the statute, in two cases where a
similar need has arisen. St. 32 Hen. VIII, c. 34, applies to leases only.9
It does not apply to deeds. Yet the doctrine of covenants running with
the land applies to deeds,"o provided that privity of estate be estab-
lished,1 and the intention that the covenant shall run is sufficiently
declared.2 So also where the owner of a business and good will con-
veys it to another, with a covenant or agreement on his own part not to
'See recitals in (1540) 32 Hen. VIII, c. 34- The statute is reprinted in 2
Gray, Cases on Real Property (2d ed. 1905) 321.
7 Privity of estate is defined as "mutual or successive relationship to the same
right of property." Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Co. (1912) 225 U. S. III,
129, 32 Sup. Ct. 641, 643. "
"Donaldson v. Strong (19o7) 195 Mass. 429, 8I N. E. 267; Mason v. Smith
(188) 131 Mass. 5Io.
'It is in force in most of the states of the union either as part of the common
law, or by re-enactment. Sims, op. cit., 73 et seq. See also Howland v. Coffln,
supra note 5; Patten v. Deshon, supra note 5; Carleton v. Bird, supra note 5;
Scott v. Lunt, supra note 5; Sheets v. Selden, supra note 5. It is not in forcein Ohio but another statute is held to give the same remedy. Mastery v. South-
worth (1859) 9 Ohio St. 340; Broadwell v. Banks (19o5, C. C. D. Mo.) 134 Fed.
470, 474.
1 Pakenham's Case (1368) Y. B. 42 Edw. III, p. 3, pl. 14; Anonymous (1582)
Moore 179, pl. 3; Morse v. Aldrich (1837, Mass.) 19 Pick. 449; 15 C. J. 1241.
'Plymouth v. Carver (1834, Mass.) 16 Pick. 183; 15 C. J. 1238.
'Savage v. Mason (1849, Mass.) 3 Cush. 5oo; 15 C. J. 1241.
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establish a competing business to the detriment of the good will so con-
veyed, both the good will and the covenant or agreement for its pro-
tection are in a sense appurtenant to the business conveyed, and a
subsequent assignee of the business and good will may enforce the agree-
ment13 at least in equity. In other words, the covenant or agreement
4
becomes an incident of the business and, in equity at least, in effect runs
with it.'15 Thus entirely apart from the provisions of 32 Hen. VIII, c.
34, which applies neither to deeds nor to convenants or agreements for
the protection of the good will of a business conveyed, we find that the
grantee or assignee has, in equity at least, a remedy upon or an obliga-
tion under a covenant or contract to which he is not a party because it
touches and concerns property which has passed to him. In both
instances a chose in action so inheres in the property that ownership of
the property carries with it a remedy upon this executory incident
thereof 6 in spite of the rule that title to a non-negotiable chose in
action cannot pass by assignment, and the further rule that only parties
to an agreement can sue or be sued upon it.
Although at first sight there is a seeming similarity between the
running of a covenant and an assignment of it, the two situations are
entirely distinct. An assignment of the covenant carries a right to
sue in the name of the assignor, or of his personal representative if he
be dead.17  It confers the benefit of the covenant on the assignee with-
out the burden, although of course the assignee cannot recover without
proof that the obligations of the assignor have been performed. The
' California Steam Nay. o. v. Wright (1865) 6 Calif. 258; Swanson v. Kirby
(1896) 98 Ga. 586, 26 S. E. 71; Hedge v. Lowe (1877) 47 Iowa, 137; Klein v.
Buck (1895) 73 Miss. 133, 18 So. 891; Palmer v. Toins (1897) 96 Wis. 367, 71
N. W. 654; Elwes v. Crofts (85o) io C. B. 241; Jenkins v. Eliot (19o6) 192
Mass. 474, 78 N. E. 431; Foss v. Roby (igo7) 195 Mass. 292, 81 N. E. 19q; Myott
v. Greer (IgIo) 204 Mass. 389, 90 N. E. 895; see also Old Corner Book Store v.
Upham (igo7) 194 Mass. Ioi, 8o N. E. 228; 20 Cyc. 1281, note 36.
"In this case the obligation need not be under seal, although in the case of
land nothing except a covenant will run. Standen v. Chrismas (1847) io Q. B.
135. There is conflict whether a stipulation which purports to bind the 
grantee
of a deed poll (who seals nothing) can be deemed a covenant by him which will
run. Kennedy v. Owen (1884) 136 Mass. 199 and cases cited.
13 See authorities note 13 supra.
" It must be noted, however, that, in the case of covenants running with the
land, a stranger to the title cannot attach an incident to the property. Thus
even though the covenant of a stranger touches and concerns the land, it cannot
run for want of privity of estate. See note ii vtpra.
' Thompson v. Rose (1828, N. Y.) 8 Cow. 266; Grover v. Grover (1837, Mass.)
24 Pick. 261; Foss v. Lowell, etc., Say. Bank (1873) I1 Mass. 285; Pierce 
v.
Boston Say. Bank (18o) 129 Mass. 425. Statutes in many states now prinit
or even require that the suit shall be brought in the name of the real party in
interest, but this is merely a change in form and the defendant may maintain
against the assignee any defence which he could maintain against the assignor.
See Rogers v. Abbot (igio) 2o6 Mass. 27o, 92 N. E. 472.
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right of the assignee, therefore, rests upon the privity of contract exist-
ing between the assignor and the defendant, and is derivative, not
direct. But where the covenant runs by reason of privity of estate,
transfer of the estate carries with it the benefit and the burden of the
covenant,18 even though it does not relieve the original covenantor of the
buiden imposed upon him by privity of contract.'9  Moveover, as we
have already seen, the remedy is direct, not derivative. The difference,
therefore, is that in the case of an assignment we have a derivative
remedy resting upon privity of contract, while in the case of the
running of a covenant we have a direct remedy resting upon privity of
estate, because the covenant is appurtenant to the estate.
Another class of rights, which superficially resembles covenants which
run with the land, is sometimes confused with them. The Chancellor
will often compel one who takes property with notice of an equity to
respect that equity even though no action at law would lie as against
this particular defendant to recover damages. In this class fall a large
class of equitable restrictions upon the use of real estate, which may be
enforced against those who take with notice of the covenant, even
though they do not run with the land.20 A true covenant which runs
with the land, being an incident thereof and appurtenant thereto, would
bind even a purchaser for value and without notice of the covenant.
So, also, if A, owning real estate or an interest therein, makes a contract
in respect of it, and thereafter disposes of it to one who takes with
notice, equity may still decree specific performance, not only against
the grantor, but likewise against the grantee with notice.2 ' But this
class of cases rests upon the equitable principle of privity of conscience,
not upon the legal principle of privity of estate.
To sum up, therefore, a true covenant which "runs" with the land
"runs" by reason of privity of estate. It must be distinguished from
assignments, which rest upon a derivative privity of contract, and the
equitable principle, which permits enforcement of a lawful contract
SNorthern T. Co. v. Snyder (896, C. C. A. 7th) 76 Fed. 34, 36; Minshull v.
Oakes (1858, Exch.) 2 Hurl. & Norm. 793; Dyson v. Forster [igog, H. L.] A. C.
98; Prout v. Robey (1872, U. S.) 15 Wall. 471; Purvis v. Shuman (1916) 273
Ii. 286, x12 N. E. 67_9; Morse v. Aldrich (1837, Mass.) i Pick. 449. Citations
might be added almost indefinitely.
"Barnard v. Godscall (1612, K. B.) Cro. Jac. 309; Mason v. Smith (1881) 131
Mass. 510, 51I (senble) ; Jones v. Parker (1895) 163 lass. 564, 568, 4o N. E.
1O44, 1O45; Neal v. Jefferson (1912) 212 Mass. 517, 522, 99 N. E. 334, 335;
Auriol v. Mills (1790, K. B.) 4 T. R. 94, 99.
'The leading case is Tulk v. Moxhay (1848, Ch.) 2 Phil. 774. The discussion
of this principle is beyond the scope of this article.
'Albiani v. Evening Traveller Co. (1914) 220 Mass. 20, 1O7 N. E. 4o6, and
cases cited. Conveyances in fraud of creditors.are another familiar example of
the same principle.
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against persons who take with notice, which rests upon privity of
conscience.
We pass. therefore, to our main problem, namely, what principle
governs the running of covenants in leases by reason of privity of
estate. This problem, as we shall see, divides into two parts-the ques-
tion as to what coyenants the policy of the law will permit to run, and
the question as to what covenants the parties to the instrument intend
shall run. As was said in Masury v. Southworth:
2
"From this view, it is obvious that, as to the first point, the nature
and character of a covenant which may inhere in the land, we are to
look at the reason and policy of the law; and, as to the second point,
whether it does so inhere as to give a right and create an obligation in
the case of assignees, we must look at the intent of the parties creating
the estate. The law must say that the covenant may inhere, and the
parties must say that it shall inhere."
II
THE TEST FOR COVENANTS WHICH THE LAW PERMITS TO RUN
Taken alone St. 32 Hen. VIII, c. 34, might perhaps be construed
broadly enough to apply to almost any covenant which caprice might
insert in a lease. It was, however, passed to correct an injustice-the
loss by those in privity of estate of the contractual relation which ren-
dered that estate of mutual value. Moreover, the statute was in clear
derogation of the then common law. It was, therefore, strictly con-
strued. In spite of the broad language employed, the court resolved
'in Spencer's Case23 that as a matter of law a covenant in a lease could
not run " if the thing to be done be merely collateral to the land and doth
not touch or concern the thing demised in any sort." In so construing
the statute the court confined it strictly to the mischief which it was
enacted to correct.
If performance of the covenant does not "touch or concern" the thing
demised in any sort" privity of estate in the thing demised furnishes no
reason for imposing a mutuality of obligation and of remedy where
none previously existed. So far as collateral covenants are concerned,
the continuance of the mutual relation to the property does not require
a remedy to the covenantee against the successors or assigns of the
covenantor. The assign of the covenantee may also be left to such
remedy as he may be able to enforce against the covenantor in the name
of the covenantee, upon the theory of an actual assignment of the cove-
nant. If once it be determined that performance of the covenant does
not "touch or concern the thing demised in any sort," it is plain that
= (1859) 9 Ohio St. 340, 348.
(1583, K. B.) 5 Co. Rep. i6a.
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neither success nor failure in enforcing it affects the mutual relation of
the assigns to the thing demised. In such a case the mischief which the
statute was intended to correct ,does not exist and the statute may well
be restrained by construction so as not to apply.
On the other hand, Spencer's Case recognizes that "if the thing to be
done" does "touch or concern the thing demised" the covenant is one
which the law permits to run and to bind assigns. This conclusion is some-
what confused by the seeming conflict between the first and the second
resolution and by the further discussion as to the necessity of "express
words" to bind assigns in certain cases.24  But if Spencer's Case leaves
the matter in any doubt, the point has been established by numerous
subsequent decisions. 25  The question, then, becomes what is meant by
the requirement that "the thing to be done" must "touch or concern the
thing demised."
Congleton v. Pattison26 was an action at law by the lessor, the Parish
of Congleton, against the assign of the lessee upon a covenant whereby
the lessee bound himself and his assigns not to employ workers from
other parishes upon the demised premises. The defendant demurred.
In sustaining the demurrer Lord Ellenborough said:
"This is a covenant in which the assignee is specifically -named; and
though it were for a thing not in esse at the time, yet being specifically
named, it would bind him if it affected the nature, quality or value of
the thing demised, independently of collateral circumstances; or if it
affected the mode of enjoying it" 27 (italics ours).
The learned judge then showed that neither the nature, quality nor
value of the land demised, nor the mode of enjoyment thereof (i. e., the
purpose for which it was or might be used) was in any way affected by
the residence of the workers employed, and then concluded:
"The covenant, therefore, not directly affecting the nature, quality,
or value of the thing demised, nor the mode of occupying it, is a collat-
eral covenant, which will not bind the assignee of the term, though
named; . .. ."
Vernon v. Smith25 was an action of covenant by the assign of the
lessor against the lessee upon a covenant by the lessee and his assigns
with the lessor and his assigns to insure the buildings then or thereafter
erected upon the demised premises against fire, in the joint names of the
defendant and of the lessor and his assigns. The statute of (1774) 14
" See notes 1 and 2 supra.
1 5 C. J. I24O, note 5I, where many authorities are collated.
(i8o8, K. B.) IO East, 130, 135. See also Bigelow, The Content of Covenants
in Leases (1914) 12 MICH. L. REv. 639, reprinted in (1914) 3o L. QUART. REV. 319.
"See also Hunt v. Danforth (1856, C. C. D. R. I.) 2 Curt. 592; Mesa Market
Co. v. Crosby (i9og, C. C. A. 8th) 174 Fed. 96, lO2.
' (1821) 5 Barn. & Aid. i.
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Geo. 3, c. 78, provided that in case of fire the proceeds of the policy
should be laid out in rebuilding the burned structures. The defendant
demurred. The court (Abbot, C.J., Bayley, Holroyd, and Best, J.J.)
unanimously overruled the demurrer.29  In the course of his opinion
Best, J., laid down the following test for the covenants which the law
permits to run:3o
"It is a covenant beneficial to the owner of the estate, and to no one
but the owner of the estate; and therefore may be said to be beneficial to
the estate, and so directly within the principle on which covenants are
made to run with the land."
To illustrate the test further, he put the case of a covenant to renew
the lease, which is universally held to run s and said:
"The covenant here mentioned is not beneficial to the estate granted,
in the strict sense of the words, because it has no effect until that estate
is at an end, but it is beneficial to the owner as owner, and to no other
person. By the terms, collateral covenants, which -do not pass to the
assignee, are meant such as are beneficial to the lessor, without regard
to his continuing owner of the estate. This principle will reconcile all
the cases."
Vyvyan v. Arthur 2 was an action of covenant by the devisee of the
lessor against the administratrix of the lessee upon a covenant by the
lessee to yield certain rent and further to do suit to the mill of said lessor,
his heirs and assigns, by grinding at said mill all corn which should be
grown upon the demised premises during the 'term. The defendant
demurred. The court (Bayley, Holroyd, and Best, J.J.) overruled the
demurrer holding that the covenant in question was in the nature of a
rent service. 33  Best, J., again states the test as follows :'
"The general principle is, that if the performance of the covenant be
beneficial to the reversioner, in respect of the lessor's demand, and to
no other person, his assignee may sue upon it; but if it be beneficial to
SMasury v. Southworth (1859) 9 Ohio St. 340; Thomas v. Vonkapff (1834,
Md.) 6 G. & J. 372; Northern Trust Co. v. Snyder (1896, C. C. A. 7th) 76 Fed.
34, accord.
' Vernon v. Smith, supra.
See Abbot, Leases and the Rule against Perpetuities (1918) 27 YALE LAw
JouRw Al, 878, 883-884, notes 17 to :2, and cases cited. Leominster Gas Light Co.
v. Hillery (19o8) 197 Mass. 267, 83 N. E. 870; Lainson v. Coulson (1920) 234
Mass. 288, 295, 125 N. E. 551, 554; Warner v. Cochrane (19o4, C. C. A. 2d) 128
Fed. 553.
1 (i823, K. B.) i Barn. & Cress. 410.
'This mode of construing the covenant as a rent service must be sparingly
applied, otherwise almost any covenant which the landlord chooses to insert may
be held to run as an additional rent, thereby abolishing the distinction between
covenants which do touch and concern the land and those which do not. Cf.
Gower v. Postmaster-General (1887, Ch.) 57 L. T. (N. s.). 527.34 V1yvyas v. Arthur, supra, at p. 437.
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the lessor, without regard to his continuing owner of the estate, it is a
mere collateral covenant, upon which the assignee cannot sue."3 5
The test suggested in Vernon v. Smith and in Vyvyan v. Arthur is
the complement of the test suggested in Congleton v. Pattison. Both
tests turn upon the effect of performance. Congleton v. Pattison defines
what effect performance of the covenant must have upon the property
demised. Vernon v. Smith and Vyvyan v. Arthur define how perform-
ance must affect the covenantee. Yet if a covenant answer to the one
test it will generally answer to the other. Usually performance of the
covenant will not directly affect the nature, quality or value of the thing
demised, or the mode of occupying it or enjoying it without also affecting
the owner, as owner, that is, affecting him through or by reason of his
ownership of the property. Similarly if performance of the covenant
affects the owner through or by reason of his ownership, such perform-
ance will usually affect the property itself in one of the modes.pointed out
in Congleton v. Pattison. Yet the two tests are so different in form that
each offers an excellent method of checking cases which are upon the
border line of the other. If a covenant successfully passes both tests, it
seems reasonably safe to assume that it does "touch or concern the thing
demised."
No better illustrations could be found than Congleton v. Pattison and
Vyvyan v. Arthur. It might be thought, perhaps, that a covenant which.
prescribed what persons could be employed upon the demised land,
affected the mode of occupying or enjoying it. Yet such a covenant is
in no sense beneficial to the lessor as owner. It might, indeed, be bene-
ficial to the parish, as a parish, to require that only those who dwelt in
the parish could be employed upon the land demised. But such a bene-
fit was a benefit to the parish only in its capacity as a municipal corpor-
ation, and was of no value to it in its capacity as landlord. Hence the
test of Vernon v. Smith demonstrates the soundness of the result reached
in Congleton v. Pattison.
On the other hand, the test employed in Congleton v. Pattison throws
considerable doubt upon the actual decision in Vyvyan v. Arthur.
Undoubtedly, it was of personal benefit to the lessor that the corn grown
upon the demised premises should be ground at his mill. But his owner-
ship of the mill was, so far as appears, entirely independent of his
ownership of the demised premises. It is difficult to perceive how per-
formance of this covenant affected the demised land in any of the modes
described in Congleton v. Pattison, unless we adopt the view of the
court that such performance was in the nature of an additional rent.
This test was quoted or approved in the following cases: Allen v. Culver
(1846, N. Y.) 3 Denio, 284; Laffan v. Naglee (I858) 9 Calif. 662; Dyson v.
Forster [ipog, H. L.] A. C. 98, io2.
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But if the landlord has sold the mill, he would dearly receive no benefit
as landlord by insisting that the corn in question be ground at a mill
which had passed into the hands of a stranger. Thus while the result
in Vyvyan v. Arthur seems doubtful, and indeed, has been doubted,36
the validity of the test laid down by Justice Best in that case, and in Ver-
non v. Smith, remains unshaken. The doubt~as to the result in Vyvyan
v. Arthur simply illustrates the wisdom of proving the result reached
under that test by applying also the complementary test of Congleton
v. Pattison.
In one respect the language of the Vernon v. Smith and Vyvyan v.
Arthur test seems to require qualification. Literally applied, the lan-
guage of that test would seem to make the running of the covenant
depend on whether performance of the covenant was beneficial to the
lessor as owner of the reversion. This is not unnatural since in both
Vernon v. Smith and Vyvyan v. Arthur the plaintiff was either the
lessor or an assign of the lessor. But the lessee is likewise owner of
an interest in the land demised, namely, the leasehold. A covenant may
run, if performance of it be beneficial to the lessee as owner of the
leasehold, even though it be burdensome to the lessor as owner of the
reversion. For example, an option to the lessee to renew the leaseT
or to purchase the reversion38 may run. Both options are in operation
burdensome to the lessor as owner of the reversion, since the lessee will
not exercise them unless they are more favorable to him than any inde-
pendent agreement which he can negotiate with the owner of the rever-
sion. So, also, a covenant by the lessor to purchase at the expiration of
the term such improvements as the lessee may have annexed to the soil
may run,39 although such a covenant is clearly burdensome to the owner
See Gower v. Postmaster-General, supra note 33, where it was held that an
agreement to pay taxes upon other land not included in the demise was not an
additional rent service and did not run.
" See note 28. Indeed, this is recognized in Vernon v. Smith (1821, K. B.)
5 Barn. & Aid. i.
'Prout v. Robey (1872, U. S.) 15 Wall. 471; Ankeny v. Richardson (ig1,
C. C. A. 8th) 187 Fed. 550; Hollander v. Central Metal Co. (i9o8) 109 Md. 131,
71 Atl. 442; Laffan v. Naglee (1858) 9 Calif. 662; Blakeman v. Miller (19o8)
136 Calif. 138, 68 Pac. 587; Hagar v. Buck (1872) 44 Vt. 285; Sizer v. Clark
(19o3) 116 Wis. 534, 93 N. W. 539; Peters v. Stone (19o6) 193 Mass. 179; 186,
79 N. E. 336, 337 (semble). Contra, Woodall v. Clifton [igo5] 2 Ch. 257;
Worthing Corp. v. Heather [19o6] 2 Ch. 532. In both the latter cases the
option could be exercised at a period too remote under the letter of the rule
against perpetuities. Perhaps the result might be supported on this ground,
although the author is of opinion that the rule against perpetuities is inapplicable
to such an option inserted in a lease, if the option must be exercised during the
term. See Abbot, op. cit., 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 878, 885; Eastman Marble Co.
v. Vermont Marble Co. (1920) 236 Mass. 138, 156, 128 N. E. 177 (semble);
Battelle v. Worcester (1920) 236 Mass. 395, 128 N. E. 631 and note 41 infra.
'Mansel v. Norton (1883, C. A.) L. R. 22 Ch. Div. 769; Hunt v. Danforth
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of the reversion, in that it compels him to purchase what would other-
wise come to him without cost. Thus, while the principle of Vernon v.
Smith and Vyvyan v. Arthur is clearly sound, the test itself should be
more broadly phrased so as to include a covenant which is beneficial to
the lessee as owner of the leasehold, even though that covenant be bur-
densome to the lessor as owner of the reversion. If any covenant which
touches and concerns the land may be enforced as between assigns by
reason of privity of estate, it is plainly immaterial whether the benefit
of performance would have accrued, had there been no assignment, to
the lessor as owner of the reversion or to the lessee as owner of the
leasehold.
It must be noted, however, that the running of covenants, like the
creation of covenants, will not be permitted to infringe upon positive
rules of law or considerations of public policy. Thus, even though the
covenant touches and concerns the land, it will not run if enforcement
would violate the rule against perpetuities. An option to purchase the
demised land manifestly touches and concerns the land itself, and so
falls within the strictest limits of the tests which ordinarily govern the
running of covenants. 40 There is conflict as to whether such as option,
if exercisable during the term, will run when inserted in a lease for over
twenty-one years. 4' It seems, however, to be clearly settled that if
such an option, exercisable at a period too remote, be inserted in a
deed,4 2 it will not run. There is conflict as to whether such a covenant
(1856, C. C. D. R. I.) 2 Curt. 592; Purvis v. Shuman (igi6) 273 Ill. 286, 112
N. E. 679; Frederick v. Callahan' (1875) 40 Iowa, 311; Stockett v. Howard
(1870) 34 Md. 121; Hollywood v. First Parish (igo6) 192 Mass. 269, 78 N. E.
124; Conover v. Smith (1864) 17 N. J. Eq. 51; Lametti v. Anderson (1826,
N. Y.) 6 Cow. 302; Douglaston Realty Co. v. Hess (19o8) 24 App. Div. 5o8,
io8 N. Y. Supp. 1O36; Napier v. Darlington (1871) 70 Pa. 64; Ecke v. Fetzer
(1886) 65 Wis. 55, 26 N. W. 266. Contra, Bream v. Dickerson (184o, Tenn.) 2
Humph. 126. The following cases do not conflict, but rest upon the ground that
the intention that the covenant should run was held not to have been sufficiently
expressed. Grey v. Cuthbertson (1785) 2 Chit. 482 (overruled? Mansell v. Nor-
ton, supra); Minshull v. Oakes (1858, Exch.) 2 Hurl. & Norm. 793; In re Robert
Stephenson [191 I Ch. 802; see also Ecke v. Fetzer, supra) ; Hansen v. Meyer
(1876) 81 Ill. 321 (overruled? Purvis v. Shuman, supra); Thompson v. Rose
(1828, N. Y.) 8 Cow. 266; Coffin v. Tallman (1854) 8 N. Y. 465.
" See cases cited note 38 supra.
' It was specifically enforced in Prout v. Robey, supra note 38; Hollander v.
Central Metal Co., supra note 38; Hagar v. Buck, supra note 38; see also East-
man Marble Co. v. Vermont Marble Co., supra note 38, at p. 156 (semble);
Battelle v. Worcester, supra note 38; Abbot, op. cit., 27 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 878.
In England specific performance is denied. Woodall v. Clifton, supra note 38;
Worthing Corp. v. Heather, supra note 38; Gray, Perpetaities (3d ed. 1915)
sec. 230 b.
'London & S. W. Ry. v. Gomm. (1881) L. R. 20 Ch. Div. 562; Trevelyan v.
Trevelyan (1885, Ch.) 53 L. T. (N. s.) 853; H. J. Lewis Oyster Co. v. West
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is good as against the original covenantor or his estate.43  Consideration
of the rule against perpetuities is beyond the scope of this article.4"
But the cases noted show that in determining what covenants the law
will permit to run we must consider not only what covenants touch and
concern the land, but also whether the running of the covenant, if per-
mitted, will conflict with positive rules of law or considerations of public
policy.
It may be suggested, however, that a distinction may be taken between
leases and deeds. A lease defines the mutual relatins of landlord and
tenant. No considerations of public policy require that courts should
be jealous of the running of covenants in leases, since any obligations
or restrictions thereby imposed cannot in the ordinary case outlast the
term. Different considerations apply in the case of a deed. If a cove-
nant in a deed be held to run, it may restrict or burden the land conveyed
for an indefinite period, thereby interfering with its free use and pos-
sibly imposing a very real restraint on alienation. Similar considera-
tions may also apply to covenants in long leases which restrict or burden
other land for the benefit of the land demised, since such covenants may
measurably have the same effect as covenants inserted in deeds. But
where the covenant in a lease applies only to the land demised, and must
cease to affect it when the term expires, the courts may properly take
a liberal view as to what covenants the law will permit to run.
III
COVENANTS RELATING TO OTHER LAND AND TO THINGS NOT IN BEING
It is not the purpose of this article to give an exhaustive list of
covenants which the law permits to run. That is the function of a
(19,9) 93 Conn. 518, 1o7 Atl. 138; Winsor v. Mills (1892) 157 Mass. 362, 32
N. E. 352; Hardy v. Galloway (1892) Hii N. C. 519, i5 S. E. 8go; Barton v.
Thaw (1914) 246 Pa. 348, 92 Ati. 312; Starcher v. Duity (19o7) 6I W. Va. 373,
56 S. E. 524; Woodall v. Bruen (1915) 76 W. Va. 193, 85 S. E. 17o. The case of
Mineral Land & Imp. Co. v Bishop Mining Co. (1916) 134 Minn. 412, 159 N. W.
966 seems to rest upon statute.
'In Eastman Marble Co. v. Vernont Marble Co. (1920) 236 Mass. 138, 128
N. E. 177, such an option, inserted in a deed, was held to be void as a restraint
on alienation, but the case of a lease was expressly distinguished at p. 156. In
Worthing Corp. v. Heather [19o6] 2 Ch. 532, an option to purchase the reversion
inserted in a lease for thirty years was held to be unenforceable in equity against
an assign of the lessor, but damages were awarded against the estate of the
covenantor. The two cases may perhaps be distinguished upon the ground that,
in the first case, the option was inserted in a deed, and, in the second case, it
was inserted in a lease. See supra note 38 and Abbot, op. cit., 27 YALE LAWV
JoURIVAI., 878.
See Abbot, op. cit., 27 YALE LAW Jo uxAL, 878.
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digest or text book. It may not be without worth, however, to consider,
for purposes of illustration, two classes of covenants which have caused
some difficulty and confusion, namely, covenants relating to land other
than that demised, and covenants relating to things not in being.
It is plain that even under the rule in Spencer's Case the subject
matter of the covenant need not be the land demised. It is enough if
the covenant touches and concerns the thing demised. Congleton v.
Pattison, Vernon v. Smith, and Vyvyan v. Arthur make it clear that the
true criterion is whether performance of the covenant affects the land.
The first question, therefore, is whether a covenant to do something in
relation to other land, or upon it, may so touch and concern the land
demised that such a covenant may run.
In Sampson v. Easterby45 one T, being the owner of certain mines,
demised the same to defendant. The lease recited an agreement
between the defendant and the owner of the mines to pull down and
replace a certain smelter, which was used in connection-with the mines,
and which stood upon land not included in the demise. The lease con-
tained a covenant by the lessee and his assigns, with the lessor and his
assigns, to keep the new smelter in repair and so to leave it at the
expiration of the term. The devisee of the assign of the lessor sued
the lessee upon the latter covenant and the defendant demurred. The
court overruled the demurrer, holding (i) that a covenant to build
the new smelter should be implied, and (2) that even though the new
smelter was to be placed upon land not included in the demise, it was
so connected with the value and enjoyment of the mines that the cove-
nant to build it and leave it in good repair could and did run.
In Ricketts v. Enfield Church Wardens,4" the church wardens leased
certain land to B, with a covenant by them and their assigns with B and
his assigns' not to build beyond a certain line upon the adjoining
premises. B assigned to plaintiff, who sues upon the covenant. Held,
that even though the covenant relates to the adjoining land it is for the
benefit of, and so runs with, the land demised, and plaintiff may sue
thereon.
In Lyle v. Smith,47 the lessee of certain property covenanted for him-
self and his assigns, with the lessor and his assigns, to contribute to the
repair of a sea wall, erected for the protection of the leased premises
and other premises, but not upon the premises demised, in the proportion
' (1829, K. B.) 9 Barn. & Cress. 505 affirmed sub nom. Easterby v. Sampson
(183o, Exch. Ch.) 6 Bing. 644. Approved Dewar v. Goodman [igog, H. L.]
A. C. 72, 77.
46 [igog] i Ch. 544. See also Thruston. v. Minke (187o) 32 Md. 487; Clark v.
Martin (i865) 49 Pa. 289.
"' [igog, K. B.] 2 Ir. Rep. 58. See also Morland v. Cook (1868) L. "R. 6 Eq.
Cas. 252, where a similar result was reached as to a similar covenant contained
in a deed of partition.
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that the leased frontage bore to the total frontage. The action was
brought to compel the assign of the lessee to contribute his proportion
of the cost of such repairs. Held, that as the wall was for the benefit,
support and maintenance of the thing demised, the covenant ran with
the land demised and could be enforced against defendant.
Lack of space forbids seiting out further cases to establish the propo-
sition that a covenant touching land other than that demised may run.48
It is enough to point out that each of the covenants above considered,
two of which are affirmative and one n.egative, successfully passes the
tests laid down in Congleton v. Pattison, Vernon v. Smith, and. Vyvyan
v Arthur. We pass on to consider several cases where the covenant
touching other land was held to be collateral.
In Thomas v. Hayward,49 the lessee covenanted for himself and his
assigns to use the demised house for the sale of beer and spirits, and the
lessor covenanted for himself and his assigns that, during the term, he
would not build or keep or be interested in building or keeping any house
for the sale of beer or spirits within half a mile of the demised premises.
An assign of the lessee sued the lessor upon the latter covenant and the
defendant demurred. Held, that the covenant in question concerned
the business to be carried on upon the demised premises, rather than
the land, and could not run.
In Gower v. Postmaster-General,5 0 A, by an underlease, demised to B
all the premises comprised in two head leases except certain premises
previously demised to X by a prior underlease. B covenanted for him-
self and his assigns to pay all taxes which might be assessed, not only
on the premises demised to him, but also on the premises previously
'A considerable number of cases are collected in 12 C. J. 124o, note 52.
See also Morse v. Aldrich (1837, Mass.) I9 Pick. 449; Norman v. Wells (1837,
N. Y.) 17 Wend. 136; Shaber v. St. Paul W. Co. (1883) 3o Minn. 179.
(1869) L. R. 4 Exch. 311. The case is significant as showing that the inten-
tion of the parties that the covenant shall run will not prevail if the covenant
be of the kind which the law will not permit to run. Congleton v. Pattison
(18o8, K. B.) io East, 130 is another example. In view of the lessee's covenant
the case seems to take a rather narrow ground. Cf. Clegg v. Hands (189o,
'C. A.) L. R. 44 Ch. Div. 5o3, which held that in a lease of a public house a
convenant by the lessee and his assigns with the lessor and his assigns not to
buy or sell any beer other than that bought of the lessor will run and may be
enforced in equity by the assign of the lessor. In Norman v. Wells supra, A.
demised a saw mill and covenanted not to establish another saw mill on the
same mill stream. Held, that the covenant runs.
1' (1887, Ch.) 57 L. T. (N. s.) 527. The plaintiff contended that the covenant
to pay taxes upon the land, not demised to B, might be deemed an additional
rent as in Vyvyan v. Arthur. The lease did not so provide and the contention
was rejected. Query, as to how far covenants which would ordinarily be
collateral might be made to run by providing that the rent should be a sum of
money and performance of the act in question. Cf. Barnard v. Godscall (1612,
K. B.) Cro. Jac. 309.
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demised to X. B assigned to the defendant. Held, that the covenant
to pay taxes on the premises demised to X was collateral and did not run
so as to bind the defendant.
In Dewar v. Goodman,51 A, in 182o, made a head lease of a large
tract of land to B, who covenanted for himself and assigns to repair all
the buildings which might be erected on the premises during the term,
with a provision for reentry by lessor in case of breach. Two hundred
and eleven houses were so built. The head lease became vested in C,
who demised two of the houses to D, and covenanted for himself and
assigns with D and assigns to perform all the covenants of the head
lease as to all the premises not included in the under lease. C assigned
to Goodman (defendant) and D assigned to Dewar (plaintiff). Both
Goodman and D permitted the two hundred and nine houses not included
in the sublease to get out of repair, and A's assign, the head landlord,
entered and terminated both head lease and sublease. Dewar sues Good-
man upon the covenant to repair the two hundred and nine houses
not included in the sublease, alleging that Goodman's breach of that
covenant destroyed the sublease. The House of Lords, affirming the
judgment below, held that the covenant to repair the two hundred and
nine houses not included in the sublease was not a special covenant with
the sublessee for quiet enjoyment, did not touch and concern the land
demised to him by the sublease and, therefore, could not run. In other
words, a covenant, the performance of which directly touche and con-
cerns the sublease, may be collateral with respect to the land thereby
demised. It may be observed that while the covenant in Dewar v. Good-
man might pass the Vernon v. Smith test, it does not directly affect "the
nature, quality or value of the thing demised nor the mode of occupying
it" if that test be literally and narrowly applied, and so fails to pass
the test laid down by Congleton v. Pattison. Putting aside the fact that
the sublessee may lose his lease if the covenant be not performed, which
might properly be taken care of by a covenant for quiet enjoyment,
he derives no benefit from the repair of houses which do not stand on
the demised premises. The case shows the value of the double test and
is a striking example of the unwillingness of the English courts to
extend the rule as to convenants running with the land. The court,
however, recognizes that a covenant touching or to be performed upon
land other than that demised is not as matter of law collateral in all
cases, for Lord Collins says, at p. 77:
"I think counsel for defendant perhaps relied too much on the con-
tention that privity of estate was not established between the plaintiff
and defendant in the action in respect of the land on which the covenant
of the sub-lessee was to be performed. No doubt privity of estate must
exist between the assignee of the reversion and the assignee of the
" [igog, H. L.] A. C. 72, affirming [i9o8, C. A.] i K. B. 94.
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land demised, but privity of estate between the same parties is not vital
in respect of the land on which the covenant is to be performed. The
reason why the covenant to do something on land other than that
demised presumably does not run is. not because there is no privity of
estate in the land on which the covenant is to be performed, but because
such a covenant is prima facie collateral, i. e., does not touch or concern
the land demised. But instances may be imagined of covenants to do
things on land other than that demised which touch and concern so
nearly the land demised as to run with it. Of this Sampson v. Easterby
is an instance, if it be assumed, as it seems to have been, that no demise
was to be implied of the site on the waste where the mill was to be
built. . . .I agree with the Court of Appeal that Sampson v. Easterby
is no authority for the running of the covenant in this case. It does
decide that a covenant may run although there is no privity of estate in
the land on which the covenant is to be performed, but it in no way
supports the contention that the covenants in this case were other than
collateral."
We turn to covenants, the subject matter of which is not in being.
The distinction between covenants whose subject matter is in being and
coyenants whose subject matter is not in being is made by Spencer's
Case. While the first resolution, if literally construed, might seem to
indicate that a covenant whose subject matter is not in being-e. g., a
covenant to build a new structure upon the demised premises-cannot
run, the second resolution shows that this is not the case. It is settled
that a covenant may run even though the subject matter of it is not in
being. Thus, a covenant by the lessee to construct improvements and
to surrender the same in good repair 5 2 or a covenant to repair,5 3 or to
insure54 improvements which may in the future be placed upon the land,
may run. The same- is true of a covenant to supply the demised
premises with water 55 and of certain covenants by the lessee touching
a railway to be built by him on the land demised. 56 So, also, a covenant
by the lessor to purchase such improvements as may thereafter be placed
by the lessee upon the demised premises may run with the land.57 In
'Sampson v. Easterly (1829, K. B.) 9 Barn. & Cress. 505, affirmed (Exch. Ch.)
sub non. Easterby v. Sampson (1830) 6 Bing. 644; Peters v. Stone (io6) 193
Mass. 179, 79 N. E. 336; see also Allen v. Culver (1846, N. Y.) 3 Denio, 284;
Hayes v. Nelu York M. Co. (1874) 2 Colo. 273; Magoon v. Eastman (1912) 86
Vt. 261, 84 Atl. 869; Dewar v. Goodman, supra note 51.
'Allen v. Culver, supra note 52; Coburn v. Goodall (1887) 72 Calif. 498;
Magoon v. Eastman, supra note 52; Minshull v. Oakes (1858, Exch.) 2 Hurl.
& Norm. 793. But not buildings upon other land. Dewar v. Goodman, supra
note 52.
Vernon v. Smith (1821, K. B.) 5 Barn. &. Aid. i; Masury v. Southworth
(1859) 9 Ohio St. 340; Northern Trust Co. v. Snyder (1896, C. C. A. 7th) 76
Fed. 34; see also Thomas v. Vonkapff (1834, Md.) 6 G. &. J. 372.
'Jourdain v. Wilson (1821, K. B,) 4 Barn & Ald. 266.
'Hemingway v. Pernandes (1842, Ch.) 13 Sim. 228.
" See supra note 39.
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all these cases the covenants may run although the subject matter of the
covenant is not the land and is not ih being when the covenant is made.
Performance of each of these covenants intimately affects the land.
Every one of them passes both the test laid down by Congleton v. Patti-
son and also the test laid down by Vernon v. Smith and Vyvyan v.
Arthur. Indeed, the subject matter of the covenant in both the laftter
cases was neither the land itself nor a thing in being at the time the
covenant was made. In Vernon v. Smith the covenant was to insure
buildings which might in future be placed upon the land, while in
Vyvyan v. Arthur the subject matter of the covenant was corn which
might be grown thereafter upon the demised premises. It is evident
therefore, that in determining whether the covenant is of such a char-
acter that the law will permit it to run with the land, the question
whether the subject matter of the covenant is, or is not, in being is not
decisive. The controlling fact is the effect of performance. If that
passes the tests laid down by Congleton v. Pattison and Vernon v. Smith
it may ordinarily be assumed that the covenant is one which the law per-
mits to run, even though the subject matter of it be other land or a
thing not yet in being.
IV
THE INTENTION OF THE PARTIES THAT THE COVENANT
SHALL RUN
If the covenant be one which the law permits to run, the question
whether it shall run is one of intention. Although an express provision
that the covenant shall run will not avail if the covenant be collateral,
5 8
the law does not require that any covenant shall run against the will
of the parties to the lease. As the question whether a covenant which in
law may run, shall run, is purely one of intention, we should expect
that that intention would be collected from -the entire instrument con-
strued in the light of the circumstances under which it was made. Such
seems to be the law in a few advanced jurisdictions.
5 9 But much con-
fusion as to this question of intention has been caused by the distinction
taken in the first and second resolutions in Spencer's Case.
The first resolution declares that "where the covenant extends to a
thing in esse, parcel of the demise . . . . [it] shall bind the assignee
although he be not bound by express words." The second resolution
" See, for example, Congleton v. Pattison (18o8, K. B.) IoEast, 130; Thomas
v. Hayward (1869) L. R. 4 Exch. 311; Dewar v. Goodman [19o9, H. L.] A. C. 72.
wPurvis v. Shuman (1916) 273 Ill. 286, 294, 112 N. E. 679; Sexauer v. Wilson
(1907) 136 Iowa, 357, 362, 1J3 N. W. 941; Peters v. Stone (19o6) 193 Mass. 179,
185, 79 N. E. 336, 337; Hollywood v. First Parish (19o6) 192 Mass. 269, 78 N. E.
124; Masury v. Southworth (1859) 9 Ohio St. 340, 359.
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declares that a covenant to "make a new wall upon some part of the
thing demised . . . shall bind the assignee by express words." These
two resolutions distinguish covenants which may run into two groups,
namely, covenants as to a thing in being and covenants to make new
things in the future. According to Spencer's Case, "express words"
are not required to bind assigns to perform covenants of the first class,
while "express words" are required to bind assigns to perform covenants
of the second class. Thus, the effect of these two resolutions seems
to be that, if the covenant relates to a thing in being, the intention that
it shall run is presumed to exist unless rebutted, while, if the covenant
relates to a thing not in being, the intention that it shall not run is pre-
sumed unless the intention that it shall run is declared by "express
words." So considered, these two resolutions seem to lay down two
rules of construction which assume, in the absence of "express words,"
that the intention that the covenant shall 'or shall not run depends upon
whether the subject matter of the covenant is or is not in being.
In the last analysis, intention is a question of fact. A rule of con-
struction establishes a presumption as to that fact. But a presumption
may easily be misused to defeat intention rather than as a means of
determining intention. If the presumption be flung into the scale in
the first instance, and then the instrument be examined to ascertain
whether the language thereof is sufficiently clear to rebut the presump-
tion, there is much danger that an a priori conception of the court may
be substituted fbr the actual intention of the parties to the instrument.
If, on the other hand, the instrument be first examined in the light of
all the circumstances and the presumption be resorted to only when the
scales hang even, it performs a legitimate function in substituting a
definite make-weight to determine what would otherwise be a mere
guess.
The question whether a covenant which may run is intended to run
is simply the question whether the covenant is intended to enure to and
bind all the persons who may from time to time occupy respectively the
position of landlord and of tenant of the demised premises, or whether
it is intended to be personal to the original parties to the lease. The
fact that it is inserted in the lease is a circumstance which in and of itself
would seem to indicate that it was intended to govern all who might
occupy the mutual relation of landlord and tenant. The first resolution
recognizes and gives effect to this natural assumption as to intention in
all cases where the subject matter of the covenant is in existence when
the lease was made. Broadly speaking, it seems to be the accepted rule
in most jurisdictions. The second resolution apparently assumes that
a covenant which may run is nevertheless intended to be personal if it
relates to a thing not in being, unless the parties declare a contrary
intention by express words. There seems to be no logical basis for this
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assumption, and it has been severely criticized.
60 But it must be
admitted that the authority of the second resolution in Spencer's Case
has not spent its force in many jurisdictions,
6 ' although the tendency
seems to be to restrict it to its precise facts, viz., an absolute covenant
to make a new thing, and to escape from it where possible.
62
The tendency to restrict the second resolution so far as may be appears
in a variety of forms. Some courts have been very astute to discover
that the covenant related in some aspect to a thing in being, and so fell
within the first resolution. 63  In England, the case of Grey v. Cuthbert-
son6i 4 held that a covenant to buy such bushes as might be on the land
at the expiration of the lease would not run where assigns were not
named, .but this case seems to be much shaken, if not overruled, by
Minshull v. Oakes, 5 which held that a covenant to repair such buildings
as were or might be placed on the land would run even though assigns
were not expressly bound. The latter case confined the second resolu-
tion in Spencer's Case to an absolute covenant to make a new thing, and
distinguished it from a covenant which was contingent upon the exist-
ence of the future buildings to which it related. Minshull v. Oakes has
been followed in many American jurisdictions6
6 but there is a case to
the contrary in Tennessee.6 In Illinois, Hansen v. Meyer'
8 followed
Grey v. Cuthbertson but seems to be shaken, if not overruled, by Purvis
v. Shuman.69 When these cases are considered with those which frankly
criticize the rule of construction laid down by the second resolution as
illogica17 and with those which adopt what appears to be the sounder
'Masury v. Southworth, supra note 59; Sexauer v. Wilson, supra note 59;
Purvis v. Shuman, supra note 59; Minshull v. Oakes (1858, Exch.) 2 Hurl. &
Norm. 793; Bald Eagle Ry. v. Nittany, etc. Ry. (1895) 171 Pa. 284, 294, 33
At. 239.
61Doughty v. Bowman (1848, Exch.) ii Q. B. 444; Coffin v. Tallman (1854)
8 N. Y. 465.
iMinsliull v. Oakes (1858, Exch.) 2 Hurl. & Norm. 793; In re Robert
Stephenson [1915] i Ch. 802; Purvis v. Shuan, supra note 59; Sexauer v.
Wilson, supra note 59; Peters v. Stone, supra note 59; Conover v. Smith (1864)
17 N. J. Eq. 51; Masury v. Southworth, supra note 59; Napier v. Darlington
(1871) 70 Pa. 64; Ecke v. Fetzet (1886) 65 Wis. 55, 26 N. W. 266; Northern
T. Co. v. Snyder (1896, C. C. A. 7th) 76 Fed. 34; Tuttle v. Leiter (897,
C. C. N. D. Ill.) 82 Fed. 947.
' See, for example, Woodruff v. Trenton Water P. Co. (1856) IO N. J. Eq.
489, 505; Winfield v. Heming (187o) 21 N. J. Eq. 188, 189; Allen v. Culver
(1846, N. Y.) 3 Denio, 284..
(1785) 2 Chit. 482.
See note 62 supra.
See notes 57 and 39 supra.
Bream v. Dickerson (184o, Tenn.) 2 Humph. 126.
(1876) 81 Ill. 321.
(1916) 273 Ill. 286, 112 N. E. 670.
.0 See note 6o supra.
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rule, that the intention as to whether the covenant shall run is to be
ascertained from the whole instrument,7' it seems plain that the rule of
construction declared by the second resolution is on the defensive and
may ultimately be overthrown altogether.
Another proof that the rule of construction declared by the second
resolution is to be avoided rather than enforced is the readiness of many
courts to discover some language in the covenant which is broad enough
to include and bind assigns. Even Spencer's Case does not require that
the word "assigns" be employed as a word of art ;72 the second resolu-
tion requires only that assigns be bound by "express words." Thus, a
provision that the words "lessor" and "lessee" shall be held to include
the "assigns" of each is enough.7 3  The use of the word "assigns" in
another covenant,74 or in the habendum clause-' of a lease for fifty
years, has been held sufficient. So, also, the words "heirs, executors and
administrators" 76 or "lessor and those claiming under him"'7 7 or even
"legal representatives 7 8 have all been held to be broad enough to include
"assigns," while several cases, have collected from the entire lease the
intent that a covenant whose subject matter was not in being should run,
although neither the word "assigns" nor any equivalent words were
employed.7 9  These cases are a further illustration that modern courts
are astute to avoid the rule of construction laid down by the second
resolution, if they have adequate reason to believe that that rule would
defeat rather than effectuate the intent of the parties to the lease.
' See note 59 supra.
""Assigns" is not a word of art like "heirs" in a deed. Sexauer v. Wilson
(1907) 136 Iowa, 357, 363, 113 N. W. 941; Masury v. Southworth (1859) 9 Ohio
St. 340, 350.
"' Clegg v. Hands (I89O, C. A.) L. R. 44 Ch. Div. 503.
7"in re Robert Stephenson Co. [I91] 1 Ch. 802, 8o7.
'Hollywood v. First Parish (x9o6) 192 Mass. 269, 78 N. E. 124.
"'Ankeny v. Richardson (iII, C. C. A. 8th) 187 Fed. 55o.
" Stockett v. Howard (1870) 34 Md. 121.
18Douglaston Realty Co. v. Hess (i9o8) 124 App. Div. 508, io8 N. Y. Supp.
1o36; see also New York Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Armstrong (i885) II7 U. S. 59i,
597, 6 Sup. Ct. 877; Wilckens v. Wilckens (1914, C. C. A. 8th) 217 Fed. 5o8.
'Peters v. Stone (I9O6) 193 Mass. I79, 79 N: E. 336; Northern T. Co. v.
Snyder (1896, C. C. A. 7th) 75 Fed. 34; Tuttle v. Leiter (1897, C. C. N. D. Ill.)
82 Fed. 947; cf. also cases cited under note 61 supra.
